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SCRAPPING STRICT REVIEW IN FREE
EXERCISE CASES
Robert D. Kamenshine *
In theory, the Supreme Court has provided a "virtually unique
protection for religious exercise, one substantially greater than for
speech."I This protection takes the form of a strict scrutiny standard for general regulations adversely affecting religiously based actions or refusals to act. The Court, however, when confronted with
objectionable consequences of the strict review standard, simply
looks for and finds a way out.2 I do not quarrel with the decision to
back away from strict review. The Court was wrong from the start
in heading down this path. It should, however, explicitly acknowledge the error and reformulate its overall approach to enforcing the
free exercise guarantee.
I

Several potential "outs" maintain nominal adherence to strict
review. First, although establishment clause concerns have deterred
the Court from overtly rejecting a free exercise claim as not truly
"religious," the Court has given hints of this view.3 Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinions in Wisconsin v. Yoder,4 and Thomas v.
Review Board of Indiana,s accepted free exercise claims but with
notes of caution. In Yoder, he emphasized that "we are not simply
dealing with a way of life,"6 such as Thoreau's. More recently, in
Thomas, while he criticized the state court for too closely reviewing
the religious claim of a Jehovah's Witness, he also stated that "[o]ne
•

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of
Recent Developments, a paper presented at 1986 "Religion and the State" symposium, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, to be published in 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV.- (1987) (forthcoming).
2. /d.
3. See Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579,
590-91.
4. 406 u.s. 205 (1972).
5. 450 u.s. 707 (1981).
6. 406 U.S. at 235. Moreover, since the religious claim of the Amish was so "vital" to
their faith, it was "one that probably (even] few other religious groups . . . could make." /d.
at 236.
I.
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can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the
Free Exercise Clause." 7 This past term, the Chief Justice's plurality
opinion in Bowen v. Roys alluded to the fact that "[b]ased on recent
conversations with an Abenaki chief," a Native American "had recently developed a religious objection to obtaining a Social Security
number for Little Bird of the Snow [his two-year-old daughter)."9
It is not overly cynical to suggest that the plurality viewed this
claim as "bizarre." A later footnote pointed out that virtually every
government action might be susceptible to some religious objection.
For example, requiring the filing of a tax return on Wednesday
(Woden's Day)to might violate Norse mythology. But, as in
Thomas, there probably also was the recognition that it would have
been inappropriate expressly to judge the substantiality of the religious claim.
It is also possible to escape strict review by finding that a contested regulation places only a slight burden on religious exercise.
This was one ground on which the Court upheld denial of educational benefits to conscientious objectors in Johnson v. Robison.tt
Again, in Bob Jones University v. United States 12 the Court assessed
the burden on free exercise. It upheld denial of tax-exempt status to
religious colleges that engaged a racial discrimination. Although
primarily relying on the government's compelling interest in eliminating all racial discrimination, t3 the Court also considered the burden on the schools. It noted that while there would be "substantial
impact on the operation of private religious schools," denial of taxexempt status "[would] not prevent those schools from observing
their religious tenets."t4 Most recently, in Tony and Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,ts the Court found virtually no
burden in a requirement that a religious foundation comply with
7. 450 U.S. at 715. Justice Stevens, however, concurring in Goldberg v. Weinberger,
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982), stressed the
inappropriateness of such judgments.
8. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
9. /d. at 2150.
10. /d. at 2156 n.l7.
II. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
12. 461 u.s. 574 (1983).
13. The Court assumed that the government's interest was equally strong no matter
what the source of the discrimination. It is not evident, however, that the government has
the identical interest in eliminating private discrimination as it clearly does in conforming to
the requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments vis-a-vis governmental
discrimination.
14. 461 U.S. at 604.
15. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985).
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minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.
While something more than a de minimus burden ought to be
required, it is difficult to perceive an intelligible framework within
which the Court determines how much is enough. Moreover, given
the strict review standard there is a strong incentive to find the burden too small in cases where the Court otherwise would have difficulty sustaining the regulation.
Finally, if the Court concludes that strict review is applicable,
it may too readily accept the existence of a "compelling" governmental interest and the "necessity" of the particular regulation as a
means of advancing that interest. This point was very effectively
made by Justice Stevens in his United States v. Lee concurrence.I6
He observed that exempting Amish employers from payment of social security taxes easily could have been accomplished without detriment to the social security system. Therefore he suggested that
the standard the Court actually applied placed "an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects [on free exercise
grounds] to a valid and neutral law of general applicability."11
Yoder, involving compulsory school attendance laws, was the
Court's principal exception to this standard, and attempts to distinguish it were unconvincing. By contrast, he viewed Thomas and
Sherbert v. Verner Is as arguably distinguishable instances in which
a higher standard properly was applied. This was because the decisions involved laws intended to provide a benefit to a limited class of
otherwise disadvantaged persons.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowen argued for substitution
of a deferential standard in one class of free exercise class-those
involving challenges to generally applicable requirements for receipt
of government benefits. Bowen was a free exercise challenge to the
requirement that an applicant for AFDC benefits must furnish the
state with his social security number. The Burger opinion drew a
critical "distinction between governmental compulsion and conditions relating to governmental benefits."I9 Cases of direct compulsion, for example those involving criminal penalties, warranted
strict review. But where the government decided to treat all benefit
applicants alike the following standard applied:
Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or
against religion in general, the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates
16.
17.
18.
19.

455 U.S. at 262.
/d. at 263 n.3.
374 u.s. 398 (1963).
106 S. Ct. at 2155.
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that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its
application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest [i.e., the
rational basis test].20

Thus, contrary to Justice Steven's position, the Burger opinion
would retain strict review for cases of direct compulsion, such as
Yoder. However, like Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger would
continue the strict review standard in cases of the Sherbert and
Thomas variety. He distinguished these as involving a " 'good
cause' standard [that] created a mechanism for individualized exemptions." Where there was such a mechanism, the failure to extend an exemption to instances of religious hardship "suggests [an
impermissible] discriminatory intent."2I
The Chief Justice's proposal, involving a distinction between
compulsion and denial of benefits, is objectionable unless one is prepared totally to repudiate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.22 The Burger opinion offers no reason why conditions on
freedom of speech, for example, should be subjected to any greater
scrutiny than conditions on free exercise of religion. If a denial of
benefits is not as substantial an interference with free exercise as
direct compulsion, the same would be true for freedom of speech or
any other fundamental right. While I have reservations about the
doctrine's present breadth of application,23 I would not totally
abandon it. Therefore, in free exercise cases, I would continue to
apply the same standard to a general regulation that results in a
denial of benefits as I would to one compelling or forbidding conduct and imposing sanctions for violation.
Justice Stevens endorses such uniformity under a standard by
which "the objector . . . must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemption from a valid law of general applicability."24 However, he does
not fully explain his rationale. The remainder of this article, by a
reconciliation of free exercise with freedom of speech principles, explains why a somewhat more rigorous intermediate standard of review should be uniformly applied.
II

Originally, the Court drew a major distinction between reli20. /d. at 2156.
21. /d.
22. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2168 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
23. These reservations, which I plan to discuss in a later article, relate to whether the

doctrine should be uniformly applied without regard to the particular liberty at issue.
24. Lee, 455 U.S. at 262.

1987]

FREE EXERCISE

151

gious belief and conduct, finding one absolutely protected and the
other subject to regulation on essentially a rational basis standard.
Reynolds v. United Stateszs (sustaining anti-polygamy laws) is a
good example. Does anyone seriously entertain the idea that if the
Court were to reconsider Reynolds, it would apply strict review to
uphold the religiously dictated practice? As in recent decisions, it
again would find a way out.
Of course, as Dean Choper has observed, if the free exercise
clause is to have an independent meaning here, it must protect religiously based conduct not otherwise qualifying under the freedom of
speech guarantee.26 Further, I agree that it must accord this conduct a higher level of protection than that available under the due
process clause's deferential rational basis standard. However, contrary to Dean Choper's position, application of strict review is
unjustified.
Strict review should be confined to regulation of religious practices that are closely "akin"27 to religious speech, that is, those
highly unlikely to be regulated absent a purpose to suppress the particular religion. Such practices, for example wearing a cross or a
Star of David or sprinkling someone in a baptismal ceremony, produce few if any external effects that are customarily the subject of
legitimate regulation. These cases in essence are viewpointdiscrimination free speech cases like those involving outlawing display of a red flagzs or prohibiting the wearing of black arm bands.29
By contrast, religiously based conduct such as handling poisonous snakes,Jo using drugs,JI or refusing to send one's children to
high school evoke societal health, safety and welfare concerns unrelated to the suppression of any religion. Whether or not any of this
religiously based conduct having substantial externalities might
qualify as "speech," it should be protected as "free exercise."32
25. 98 u.s. 145 (1878).
26. Choper, supra note 3, at 581-84. The Court has equated free exercise activities with
freedom of speech in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269 (1981) (religious discussion and
prayer meetings); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981) (distribution of religious literature and solicitation of funds).
27. Cf Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
28. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
29. Tinker, 383 U.S. 503 (1969). See Choper, supra note 3, at 582.
30. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
31. Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973).
32. Professor Marshall has argued that aside from protecting religious autonomy and
preventing direct discrimination against religious practices, free exercise should afford no
independent protection to religiously based conduct. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545, 547 (1983). However, he suggests that this approach "would not be a major incursion on the existing case law" affording
heightened protection to religious conscience since Yoder, Sherbert, and Thomas all arguably
involve elements of freedom of speech. !d. at 584-85.
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However, it should receive no more protection than would expressive conduct that does fall under the freedom of speech guarantee.33 Accordingly, it would be appropriate to draw on the Court's
freedom of speech approach in United States v. O'Brien,34 the draftcard burning case. Assume, for example, that the defendant in
O'Brien had burned his draft card because of a religious conviction
that required him to do so. It would not have been logical for the
Court then to have reached a different result upholding O'Brien's
right to bum the card.
If the O'Brien standard had been applied to Yoder and
Sherbert, the Court probably would have reached different results.
The critical point in Yoder was that the state's interest in educating
children became less compelling after the eighth grade. This in
some ways is reminiscent of the application of the compelling interest standard in Roe v. Wade,Js except there the state's interest became more rather than less compelling with the passage of time.
Under O'Brien, the government's interest need not have been compelling, only "important" or "substantial." The desire to have
better-educated citizens capable of choosing a variety of occupations and professions certainly would have met this standard, even
for education past the eighth grade.
As for Sherbert, the government's important interest arguably
was to ensure that unemployment compensation was paid only to
people who truly could not find work, not to those who stayed
home for any of a variety of personal reasons, including those based
on religion. Applying O'Brien, this would seemingly justify denial
of benefits to a claimant who refused Saturday work on a religious
basis. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas observes, however,
that the state policy in Sherbert seemed to allow other personal reasons for not working but not a religious one (i.e., the case involved
impermissible discrimination against religion).36 Also, in Sherbert
the law made special provision for those who refused work on Sunday, again raising a problem of religious discrimination.
33. See Goldberg, 106 S. Ct. at 1312-13 (applying the same deferential standard to a free
exercise claim as it would to a free speech claim in a military context).
34. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court established the following standard:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
/d. at 377.
35. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
36. 450 U.S. at 723-24 n.l. In Thomas, by comparison, the state's policy was uniform.
Cf School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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In Jensen v. Qua ring 37 the driver's license picture decision, the
Court split 4-4, thereby affirming the Eighth Circuit's acceptance of
a free exercise claim. The Eighth Circuit described the state interests as "important" but not compelling.3s This would satisfy the
O'Brien test. The question of alternatives to requiring a driver's license photograph is more troublesome. The Eighth Circuit pointed
out that New York State does not require such a picture as a means
of rapid identification. However, as the court also noted, at least
forty-seven states require photographs. While a least restrictive alternatives analysis defeated application of the photograph requirement in Quaring, O'Brien's standard that the "incidental restriction
be no greater than is essential to furtherance of the interest" is not
as stringent39 and probably would be met.
Finally, there is Bowen, the social security number case. Chief
Justice Burger's opinion found that the number requirement
"clearly promote[d] a legitimate and important public interest,"
namely, preventing fraud in benefit programs. In applying the "reasonable means" part of the suggested test, the plurality opinion explained in some detail the number's utility in curtailing fraud.40
While there is a verbal difference between the plurality's standard
and that in O'Brien, it is unlikely that application of the O'Brien
standard would require a more persuasive showing of a means-ends
relation.
It has been suggested that there is a significant difference between an O'Brien situation involving speech/conduct versus one involving religion/conduct.4I To qualify for protection under tht free
exercise clause, the person's conduct must be religiously compelled,
that is, in the person's mind there is no alternative course that will
satisfy her religion's requirements. By comparison, someone like
O'Brien had the choice of expressing his opposition to the draft by
more conventional means such as distribution of a pamphlet.
There are several reasons why this distinction is not persuasive.
First, a person like O'Brien wouldn't have burned his draft card as a
symbolic protest if he believed that other available means of ex pres37. 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985), a.lf'g Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
38. 728 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (1984).
39. See United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2906-07 (1985).
40. 106 S. Ct. at 2157.
41. Stone, oral comments on Dean Choper's paper, made at 1986 "Religion and the
State" symposium, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The
paper embodying these comments, "Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free
Exercise Clause," will be published in 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.- (1987).
Dean Choper would limit free exercise protection to "those who believe that departure
from certain beliefs will carry uniquely severe consequences extending beyond the grave."
Supra note 3, at 604.
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sion were as effective. Often the symbolic protest will be the most
effective means for the average person. Second, religions are not
static, they often evolve to meet the strong demands of the society
in which they happen to exist. For example, the Mormons eventually concluded that polygamy no longer was religiously compelled.
Third, O'Brien itself never considered the availability of alternatives
to the protester; rather, it looked at the government's regulatory
alternatives. Fourth, while it is troublesome to compare the relative
values of free speech and of free exercise, the ability to communicate views on issues of public policy by means having substantial
external consequences is more vital to a democratic society than the
ability to engage in religious practices having similar costs.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has shown little enthusiasm
for strict review in post-Sherbert and Yoder decisions. Arguably, it
uses de facto the more lenient O'Brien-type middle-tier standard.
The Court should make explicit this standard. The standard is supported in theory because it appropriately puts free exercise and free
speech cases on the same plane. Moreover, it creates far fewer situations in which there is arguable tension between enforcement of
the free exercise and establishment clauses.

